History

Historical Overview

The origin and development of the Armenian press are deeply rooted in the unique historical circumstances of the Armenian people, who for centuries lacked a state of their own and were dispersed across the world after repeated conquests.

As a result, Armenian communities established settlements abroad, and it was within these diasporic centers—rather than on the territory of present-day Armenia—that the Armenian periodical press first emerged and flourished. The publication of the first Armenian periodical, Azdarar, in Madras, India, in 1794 by Armenian Apostolic Church priest Harutyun Shmavonyan, marked the beginning of this tradition. 

Within Armenia, these global Armenian communities are known collectively as the diaspora, and their publications constitute the "diasporan Armenian press," a tradition that remains vibrant to this day. The geographic centers of Armenian press activity have shifted over time in response to changing historical circumstances. 

During the era of expanding trade, Madras in India was a key hub; later, Venice in Italy became prominent. Following the Ottoman conquest  of most of historic Armenia and the rise of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople (present-day Istanbul) emerged as the main center, while under the Russian Empire, Tiflis (now Tbilisi, Georgia) played a significant role due to its concentration of Armenian intellectuals.

In the 20th century, the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire forced survivors to settle in new communities across the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. As a result, cities such as Beirut (Lebanon), Paris (France), Athens (Greece) and Boston and Fresno (United States) became major centers for Armenian publishing. The Armenian press continued to thrive and evolve in these cities throughout the 20th century, reflecting the ongoing resilience and cultural vitality of the Armenian diaspora.

The Armenian press on the eve of independence and after

The development of the printed press within the territory of present-day Armenia dates to the early 20th century, notably the 1918–1920 period of the First Republic of Armenia. At that time, Armenia had a multi-party political system, with each party operating its own press to advance its views and agendas in the political struggle. This pluralistic environment ended in 1920 with the Sovietization of Armenia: the Communist Party established a monopoly on information, and the multi-party press ceased to exist. For nearly seventy years as a Soviet republic, Armenian media was under strict state censorship.

In the beginning of sovetization, resistance movements against the Soviet authorities began to emerge across the USSR, including Armenia. In the mid-1950s, these movements gradually developed into a broader dissident network, which produced underground ‘samizdat’ (self-published) newspapers.  These clandestine publications were circulated hand to hand, with their authors facing imprisonment and exile if discovered. Despite constant pressure, Armenia’s dissident press persisted, fostering ideas of independence and national identity that helped lay the groundwork for the independence movement that began in 1988.

Between 1987 and 1990, over thirty samizdat newspapers were published in Armenia. The turning point came in 1988 with the rise of the ‘Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) movement’, as Armenians demanded the reunification of the region—populated mainly by ethnic Armenians but made an autonomous region of Soviet Azerbaijan—with Armenia. Amid Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, activists used both underground and, later, formally recognized press outlets to mobilize society. The “Karabakh Committee” and, subsequently, the Armenian National Movement party, legally published “Hayk”—the first non-communist newspaper—in 1990 with an impressive circulation of 50,000 copies. That year, roughly 100 new periodicals were launched in Armenia, produced both by journalists and newly formed political organizations.

The period from 1990 to 1992 is often described as the golden age of Armenia’s press. With the abolition of censorship, anyone could publish a newspaper, express opinions, and circulate information freely. Political battles—between communists and supporters of independence—played out not only in public rallies but also in the print media.

In 1991, Armenia passed the “Law on the Press and Other Mass Media,” which abolished ideological censorship. Restrictions were limited to state and military secrets, pornography, incitement of hatred, and the dissemination of false or unverified information.  Registering a media outlet required only a business registration at the State Register of Legal Entities of the Ministry of Justice—no special permit was necessary.

After Armenia officially declared independence on September 21, 1991, as a result of a referendum, exiled Armenian parties previously banned under Soviet rule returned and began publishing their own newspapers. 

The outbreak of war over Artsakh, however,  along with economic and energy crises caused by the blockades of Armenia by neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey, negatively affected the printed press. Many Independent newspapers closed due to a shortage of paper, limited operation of printing houses, and a public unable to afford a newspaper.. Only party and state owned newspapers with solid political and financial support survived. State television, meanwhile,  remained firmly under government control.

Thus, in the first half of the 1990s, Armenia’s media system became closely tied to political forces and generally split into opposition and pro-government camps. These divisions, unlike in Western countries, were based on allegiance rather than ideology.

Ownership structures varied: some newspapers were official party newspapers, while others, though formally “independent,” maintained close political ties or received political support, eroding public trust in the press.

The Development and Political Control of Television in Armenia

By the late 1990s, economic stabilization encouraged the rapid growth of private television. Before this, only state TV and some private channels—A1+ (established in 1991); Motherland (Mayr Hayrenik), founded in 1993; “Shant,” founded in Gyumri in 1995; and “AR,” founded in 1996—existed. 

As investment and advertising increased, new channels appeared, often linked to political and business interests. In 1998, international investor Gerard Cafesjian took a stake in Armenia TV. A wave of new private television companies followed, many with direct ties to politicians or parties, leading to the growing influence of television in shaping public opinion.

In response, authorities stepped up control. The 2000 “Law on Television and Radio” introduced licensing, and the first licensing tender in 2002 was marred by scandal: two independent channels, A1+ and Noyan Tapan, were denied broadcast frequencies, which instead went to newly created (and later inactive) stations. The freed frequencies were subsequently taken over by businessmen connected to the authorities.

By the mid-2000s, nearly all Armenian television channels were linked to political or business elites, regardless of their formal legal status.  Some networks had party representatives on their boards (Yerkir Media), while others were registered to oligarchs, members of parliament, or their relatives (H2, Dar 21, Kentron). Media holdings emerged (CS Media City, Panarmenian Media Group), managing multiple TV and radio outlets  - a clear violation of anti-monopoly provisions (see footnote 1) of the Armenian media law, although regulators denied their existence, claiming the companies were independent.

Leaked diplomatic cables and local reports confirmed strong political control over editorial policy. Prominent journalists coordinated guest lists with the president’s office; for instance, Petros Ghazaryan of Kentron TV (which was under the influence of Gagik Tsarukyan, head of the Prosperous Armenia party) reported to US diplomats that he was required to clear program guests with presidential staff. Such practices reflected broader patterns of media coordination across major television companies, which were often connected to powerful political and business figures.

During the late 2000s, under President Serzh Sargsyan, the concentration of media ownership within networks of political and business elites became even more pronounced. 

Much of this consolidation was informally linked to Sargsyan’s son-in-law, Mikael Minasyan, who, while not officially named as owner, was widely reported in the press to exert significant influence over a range of major media outlets. Owners and top managers of television stations such as A TV, Armenia TV, Hay TV, and Shant, as well as prominent online platforms like panorama.am, aysor.am, and panarmenian.net, were often Minasyan’s close friends or associates. Distribution networks for print media were reportedly controlled by the same circle. 

Media investigations and opposition reports consistently cited these connections and their effects on editorial policy.  Despite the political control over the media, Sargsyan's government was more tolerant of opposition and independent media than Kocharyan's government, allowing a certain degree of freedom of speech, opinion, and criticism.  Nevertheless, instances of intimidation, violence, and pressure against journalists continued during this period.

The Rise of Online Media

The 2018 change of power in Armenia, known as the “Velvet Revolution,” which took place to prevent thenPrime Minister Serzh Sargsyan from securing a third term in office, was largely made possible thanks to the mobilizing power of social media and the support of online media, which provided 24/7 live coverage of the unfolding events.

Online media also played a decisive role during the 2008 presidential elections and their aftermath. When a state of emergency and a twenty-day censorship were declared on March 1, 2008, online outlets became the only source of alternative information.

The internet generally provides Armenian online media with greater freedom, and the public with access to more diverse information. Reporters Without Borders’ 2025 report notes that Armenia’s online media is comparatively freer, while “most broadcast and print media, tied to major political and commercial interests, continue to face pressure regarding their editorial policies.”

In terms of regulation, online media remains underdeveloped. Although the 2003 “Law on Mass Media” also applies to online outlets—requiring them to ensure transparency by publishing key data such as the editorial office address, phone number, email, founder, and responsible publisher—there are no accountability mechanisms for failure to disclose this information. As a result, it is often impossible to identify many websites that consider themselves media outlets or to hold them accountable if they disseminate false information, defamation, insults, or hate speech.

One of the main challenges for online media is the impact of social networks, on which they are heavily dependent, since a significant portion of readers access news sites indirectly through these platforms. Any change in the algorithms of Facebook, Instagram, or others directly affects online outlets. Moreover, social networks themselves have become sources of news, where anyone can be both a content creator and a consumer.

A 2024 study on media consumption showed that the primary source for social and political news is social networks (62%), followed by television (45%), then friends (18%), while only 14% of respondents named news websites as their main source.

Social networks also pose financial challenges for online media. They absorb the bulk of Armenia’s already small advertising market. 

As a recent report on the media market noted: “Digital media competes with social media influencers, many of whom produce opinion-based content and often spread sensational and inaccurate news that entertains rather than informs audiences. Advertisers, however, often prefer influencers over traditional media, as they can be more flexible and deliver larger niche audiences.”

Nevertheless, Armenia’s current digital media environment is quite diverse. It includes traditional outlets with online versions; websites created by both opposition and ruling political forces, as well as by politicians and officials; independent outlets recognized by numerous international organizations as fulfilling a watchdog role; and media created by GONGOs (pro-government NGOs).

In the politically driven propaganda of online media, the voice of independent outlets is not always heard strongly, yet their influence on political decision-makers remains evident.

The Diaspora

There is a large audience/market for Armenia-based online media content in the diaspora. The Armenian diaspora, however, is highly diverse and is distinguished by its different media preferences and language usage. The diaspora can be divided into two parts: those who survived the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and settled mainly in the West or the Middle East and speak Western Armenian, and those who left post-Soviet Armenia, moving mainly to the USA and Russia and speaking Eastern Armenian. Georgia and Iran also have large numbers of Armenians, who have their own established communities and local media.

The traditional print media operating in the Armenian diaspora, which was published in Armenian, is currently in crisis and does not have much influence on those communities. Public and cultural figures in the diaspora are sounding the alarm about newspapers being closed (France, Turkey, the USA, etc.). At the same time, diaspora online media outlets (https://armenianweekly.com/, Armenian Weekly (USA), www.armenews.com (online version of Nouvelle d’Armenie magazine, France, etc.) have been established and operate, which publish content in the languages ​​of these countries.

These media outlets devote a lot of space to events taking place in and around Armenia, through content from their own correspondents and reprints from Armenia-based media.

According to the Zink Network’s “Media Market Analysis” study,  these diverse groups of the diaspora have distinct media consumption habits and platform preferences, so there is no universal platform that unites the diaspora.

When it comes to English-language content, there is a gap, especially among Armenians in English-speaking countries and younger individuals who are fluent in English, which would allow them to exchange information.

The content of Armenia-based media is mainly in Armenian, and only a small amount of it is translated into English. There are just a few English-language publications in Armenia. The Armenian diaspora living in Russia consumes the content of Armenian news agencies and online media that create content in Russian. There are also Armenian journalists and bloggers living in Russia who have their own channels and rely on this diasporan audience. In Russia, the printed and online periodical Noev Kovcheg is published (the largest Russian-language Armenian periodical with a circulation of more than 100,000) and covers the life of the Armenian diaspora in that country and the CIS in general.

To sum up: printed press has almost no impact on public opinion due to its very limited circulation. Television remains the leading medium in terms of audience reach and trust, but online media is competing with TV and steadily improving its position year after year.

Footnote 1:

Article 18 ("Anti-monopoly Guarantee") of the RA Law on Television and Radio, stipulates that: 1. Legal entities may have licenses for no more than one television company and one radio company broadcasting on the air, 2. Physical persons and persons connected with them may become founders and (or) participants of no more than two licensed persons (one television company and one radio company) broadcasting on the air.