Political Context
1. From Soviet Republic to Independent State
The Republic of Armenia declared independence on September 21, 1991, after seventy years as part of the USSR. On October 16 of that year, Levon Ter-Petrosyan was elected Armenia's first president in nationwide elections. HCe was a member of the Karabakh Committee, which led the Artsakh Movement that had begun in 1988, demanding Nagorno-Karabakh's secession from the Azerbaijan SSR. (Artsakh is the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic Armenian region that was an autonomous oblast within Soviet Azerbaijan. After the collapse of the USSR, it declared independence but remained internationally unrecognized, leading to decades of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.) The Artsakh question would remain central to Armenia's domestic political life for three decades until 2023, when Azerbaijan captured the region and expelled its ethnic Armenian population.
2. The Ter-Petrosyan Presidency (1991-1998)
2.1 Political Foundations and the Peace Party’s defeat
The Artsakh question became the catalyst for a palace coup in 1998. President Ter-Petrosyan resigned on February 3, 1998, citing irreconcilable contradictions within his government as to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In his resignation statement, he did not explicitly name those forcing his departure, referring instead to "forces known to you." However, it was widely understood that he meant Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, Minister of Internal Affairs and National Security Serzh Sargsyan, and Minister of Defense Vazgen Sargsyan. He stated that the peace party had been defeated.
2.2 Media Under Ter-Petrosyan
During the first years of President Ter-Petrosyan's tenure (1991-1998), independent newspapers, television companies, and news agencies were established in Armenia. This period is considered the awakening of the press.
But later the Ter-Petrosyan era established patterns of media control that would persist under subsequent administrations. His presidency was characterized by the closure of Armenian Revolutionary Federation newspapers and the Azatutyun radio station, systematic pressure on opposition press, and violence against journalists. These early years set the precedent for government intolerance of critical media coverage.
3. The Kocharyan Presidency (1998-2008)
3.1 Consolidation of Power
Robert Kocharyan became president of Armenia following his win in the 1998 snap election. He had served as Artsakh president before Ter-Petrosyan invited him to serve as prime minister of Armenia in 1997. Kocharyan would lead the country for the next decade.
3.2 Post-Election Clashes: March 1, 2008
Kocharyan's departure was marked by violence. Ter-Petrosyan had returned to politics and ran as a presidential candidate in the February 19, 2008 election. Kocharyan supported transferring power to Serzh Sargsyan, then serving as prime minister. According to official results, Sargsyan received 52.82% of the vote while Ter-Petrosyan received 21.5%. International observers noted gross violations and fraud.
Ter-Petrosyan and his supporters disputed the results in the Constitutional Court ,organizing rallies and sit-ins. The Kocharyan government responded with force. Clashes between police and protesters left ten people dead: eight protesters and two police officers. President Kocharyan declared a state of emergency from March 1-20, establishing twenty days of censorship.
The initial emergency decree stipulated that mass media publications on state and domestic political issues could only present official information from state bodies. Days later, on March 13, the published decree was modified to prohibit the media from disseminating obviously false or destabilizing information or calls to participate in illegal events.
The March 1 case is ongoing in Armenian courts, with former president Kocharyan involved as a defendant. In September 2025, the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Armenia, ordering the government to pay 245,000 euros in compensation to relatives of the victims.
3.3 Broadcasting Under Kocharyan's Control
Kocharyan brought the entire broadcasting sector under systematic government control. Influential businessmen loyal to him purchased private television companies. The National Commission on Television and Radio, responsible for distributing television frequencies through competitive procedures, lacked independence. Its members were appointed by the president and the National Assembly. In the first licensing competition in 2002, two independent television companies lost their frequencies: A1+ and Noyan Tapan. This marked a turning point in broadcast media independence.
Kocharyan maintained a circle of preferred media outlets and gave interviews exclusively to them. His administrative apparatus strictly controlled how television companies covered presidential activities. Political processes—including the 2003-2004 and 2008 opposition demonstrations—were accompanied by violence against journalists, which law enforcement typically failed to solve.
During Kocharyan's administration, Armenia experienced its only case of a journalist's murder. On December 28, 2002, Tigran Nagdalyan, chairman of the Public Television and Radio Company council, was killed at the entrance to his parents' house. The court found Armen Sargsyan, brother of Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan (killed in the October 27, 1999, parliament terrorist attack), guilty of ordering the murder. According to the court, the journalist's professional activity motivated the killing. Armen Sargsyan received a fifteen-year prison sentence.
4. The Sargsyan Presidency (2008-2018)
4.1 The Constitutional Change
Prior to2015, Armenia functioned as a semi-presidential republic with mechanisms balancing the branches of government. In 2015, third president Serzh Sargsyan initiated a constitutional referendum that transformed Armenia into a parliamentary republic. Under the new system, which took effect in 2018, the prime minister would be the de facto leader while the president held a symbolic role.The timing was significant: Sargsyan had completed two terms as president and could not be nominated again under the old system. In the 2017 parliamentary election, his Republican Party of Armenia formed a majority in parliament. In 2018, despite having promised before the 2015 referendum not to seek further office, Sargsyan was elected prime minister.
4.2 Expanding Media Control
During Serzh Sargsyan's presidency, control over media and forms of pressure expanded. Media ownership underwent reshuffling, with television companies and other media industry structures ending up in the hands of those close to his son-in-law, Mikayel Minasyan.
Political processes continued to be accompanied by violence against journalists. On November 17, 2008, investigative journalist and Hetq editor-in-chief Edik Baghdasaryan was attacked while leaving the editorial office. One person was arrested and convicted. National Assembly deputy and Minister of Environmental Protection Vardan Ayvazyan was behind the attack, though law enforcement failed to establish this connection through investigation.
The Sargsyan presidency saw the entrenchment of lawsuits against media outlets for critical speech. Political figures and business circles filed defamation and insult charges demanding large compensations. The situation was partially resolved through a Constitutional Court decision establishing reasonable compensation frameworks.
But it should also be noted that during Sargsyan's presidency, online media developed, which was more free. A strong civil society was formed, which, together with the independent press, in some cases influenced political decisions.
5. The Velvet Revolution and Its Aftermath
5.1 2018: A Non-Violent Uprising
Sargsyan's return to power as prime minister provoked widespread public outrage. Nikol Pashinyan, leader of the parliamentary opposition Yelk Alliance and a former journalist who had edited the opposition newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak (Armenian Times), seized the moment. On March 31, 2018, he began a march from Gyumri, Armenia's second-largest city, to Yerevan. The anti-government movement adopted the slogan "Take a Step, Reject Serzh."
Online media proved crucial to the movement's success, broadcasting the march live and facilitating mass mobilization. Pashinyan made extensive use of social networks, particularly Facebook Live, to call on the public to join him. Under pressure from the nationwide movement, Sargsyan resigned on April 23, 2018, after ten years of governing Armenia. Pashinyan called his movement a non-violent, popular, velvet revolution.
On May 8, 2018, the National Assembly elected Pashinyan prime minister. He received support from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Yelk, and the Tsarukyan Alliance factions, with assistance from the parliamentary majority Republican faction. Despite having continuously criticized the 2015 Constitution as creating a super-prime ministerial system, Pashinyan did not change it upon taking office and instead utilized the prime minister's broad powers.
5.2 The Current Parliamentary Landscape
The 8th convocation National Assembly was formed following snap parliamentary elections on June 20, 2021. Originally scheduled for late 2023, the elections were held early due to prolonged political crisis following Armenia's defeat in the 2020 Artsakh War.
The main contest pitted Prime Minister Pashinyan against Robert Kocharyan, who had returned to the political arena. Pashinyan's Civil Contract party secured a constitutional majority with 71 deputies. Second and third places went to Kocharyan's Armenia Alliance with twenty-nine deputies and Serzh Sargsyan's I Have Honor Alliance with seven.
As of 2025, the parliament’s faction membership stands at: Civil Contract 69, Armenia 28, and I Have Honor 6. Four deputies remain unaffiliated with factions, though they initially represented one of the main groups before leaving due to disagreements. The constitutional majority of 69 votes allows the ruling Civil Contract faction to pass any legislative initiative, effectively rendering the opposition unable to influence decision-making.
5.3 Unfulfilled Reform Promises
Although Armenia has been declared a democratic, social, legal state, no government has succeeded in building a truly democratic, legal state where law prevails and human rights represent the highest value. The 2018 public uprising was rooted in large-scale corruption, social injustice, lack of judicial independence, convergence of business and politics, and the oligarchic system.
Pashinyan came to power promising radical reforms across all these areas. However, during his seven years in office, he has not initiated systemic changes. Armenian civil society criticizes his failure to conduct judicial vetting and his subordination of the justice system to political interests. Freedom House's 2024 report states that authorities apply the law selectively and proper procedure in civil or criminal cases is not guaranteed. The report cites as an example of political interference the prime minister's SMS message to the Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council demanding his resignation.
5.4 Media Relations Under Pashinyan: Mixed Progress
Former journalist Pashinyan's governance period presents a complex picture regarding media relations. On one hand, freedom of speech levels have improved. In the Reporters Without Borders' 2025 World Press Freedom Index, Armenia advanced by nine over the previous year, ranking 34th among 180 countries. Cases of physical confrontation with journalists have become exceptions rather than routine.
Conversely, trust in the media has declined sharply. The ruling force contributes to this by targeting and labeling media outlets that criticize government activities and expose mistakes. Armenia’s media is characterized by strong political polarization. Both former and current ruling forces use media associated with them as propaganda tools in political struggle.
6. Foreign Policy Realignment
Relations with Russia and the CSTO: Armenia is formally a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has frozen its membership and does not participate in the organization's meetings. This decision followed the 2021-2022 Azerbaijani incursion into Armenian territory. According to official estimates, Azerbaijan occupies more than 150 square kilometers of sovereign Armenian territory. The CSTO failed to respond despite its obligation under the Collective Security Treaty (Article 2) to assist member countries facing threats to security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. Armenia remains an EAEU member and maintains economic activity within that organization.
Relations with strategic ally Russia have deteriorated significantly. After the failure of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Artsakh and the ethnic cleansing of the region, Armenian public opinion toward Russia shifted dramatically. According to the International Republican Institute's June 2025 survey, 27% of Armenians consider Russia a political threat, 45% view it as a political partner, and 37% see it as a security partner. Prime Minister Pashinyan characterizes this transformation as constructive while emphasizing the importance of strengthening relations with Russia.
Western Integration: On March 26, 2025, Armenia’s National Assembly adopted a law initiating the EU accession process. EU structures welcomed this step but noted that Armenia has considerable preparatory work ahead. In September 2024, the Armenia-EU visa liberalization process began.
In January 2025, Armenia signed a strategic partnership charter with the United States. The U.S.is also involved in negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, which was initialed in August 2025 in Washington.
Pashinyan's government has declared its readiness to close the chapter on the Artsakh Movement and normalize relations with neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey. The ruling Civil Contract party will campaign on this agenda in the National Assembly elections scheduled for June 2026.
7. Enduring Patterns
Across all administrations since independence, government-media relations have followed consistent patterns despite evolving mechanisms. Each government has demonstrated intolerance of criticism, attempted to control broadcast media, and engaged in violence or legal harassment of critical journalists. The methods have evolved from direct censorship and closure of outlets under Ter-Petrosyan to frequency denial and systematic broadcast control under Kocharyan, to ownership manipulation under Sargsyan, and targeting through political labeling and lawsuits alleging defamation under Pashinyan, but the fundamental dynamic of government tension with independent media persists.

