Political Control Over Media in Armenia

The MOM Team study reveals HIGH RISK of political control over Armenia's media. The majority of media outlets are owned or managed by individuals affiliated with political actors—either aligned with those in power or affiliated with opposition parties and figures. Combined with structural vulnerabilities in public broadcaster governance and documented editorial bias favoring ruling party representation, these findings demonstrate systemic politicisation of media.

The MOM Team database analysis reveals that the majority of Armenian media outlets are owned or managed by politically-connected individuals. Most media outlets are affiliated with political forces—either with the ruling power or the opposition.

For example, outlets in the database demonstrate clear connections to government officials, ruling party structures, and opposition figures—with ownership patterns reflecting political rather than editorial logic. When the majority of outlets are politically owned, media pluralism becomes deceptive pluralism. Multiple outlets exist but represent different political factions rather than diverse journalism. Citizens accessing different outlets encounter political messaging from different camps, not diverse editorial perspectives. A viewer switching between outlets aligned with government and those aligned with opposition receives competing political narratives, not competing journalism.

This politicisation extends beyond direct ownership. Critical infrastructure through which content reaches audiences is controlled by politically-connected actors. Press Stand, a significant print distributor, is owned by Arman Sahakyan, a Republican Party member and former member of Parliament. Although the print media has little influence on public opinion due to its low circulation. Ucom, a major television network operator, is linked to the Khachatryan family, with Gagik Khachatryan serving as former Finance Minister and currently facing corruption charges. These are not passive investors but actors deeply embedded in political structures.

The advertising sales infrastructure reveals even more direct political connections. Media International Services (MIS) dominated the advertising market, controlling 46% of advertising revenues and holding exclusive rights to sell advertisements for five major channels: "Armenia TV," "ATV," "ArmNews," "Yerkir Media," and "Shant." According to reports, MIS was ultimately controlled by then-President Serzh Sargsyan's son-in-law, Mikayel Minasyan, with close associates occupying key executive positions. Following the 2018 revolution, Minasyan faced various charges related to these media companies, and prosecutors allege he financed and managed multiple media outlets. However, the case has not yet been sent to court.

After the revolution, Mediahouse Armenia was founded as a second sales house to balance MIS's monopoly. However, Mediahouse Armenia is 50% owned by Public Television (state-owned), and since 2020, its finance director has been Arman Harutyunyan, brother of government official Arayik Harutyunyan and a member of the ruling Civil Contract party on Yerevan City Council. This creates direct overlap between state media, government family networks, ruling party membership, and control of advertising resources.

Even independently-owned outlets operate within constrained choices when advertising infrastructure is controlled by former government insiders (MIS under Minasyan) and current ruling party members (Mediahouse Armenia leadership). An outlet critical of the government cannot simply access alternative advertising channels—advertising sales are controlled by these two houses, one linked to a former president's son-in-law, the other directly owned by state media with ruling party family connections. An outlet seeking advertising revenue must navigate infrastructure operators with explicit political ties. Political influence operates through infrastructure control, not just ownership.

The dominance of the Public Broadcaster amplifies these vulnerabilities. The Public Broadcaster commands 60.6% of television and 56.1% of radio market share—meaning the majority of Armenians receive their television news from a single state-funded source. Its governance structure concentrates control in the executive: the Council is appointed entirely by the Prime Minister with no opposition participation. This means that control over the dominant broadcaster flows through a single political decision-maker. Research on the broadcaster's editorial decisions shows that the majority of airtime allocated to political commentary disproportionately features ruling party figures and government positions. This is not occasional bias but a systematic editorial pattern. If a citizen relies primarily on Public Television for news—likely the case for significant portions of the audience—they systematically encounter more ruling party representatives and government narratives than opposition voices or critical analysis. This is not censorship but structural bias operating through the appointment of governance, combined with documented editorial decisions. When the dominant information source—commanding 60%+ market share—systematically favors ruling party narratives through political appointment of governance combined with documented editorial bias, the structural conditions exist for citizens' information diet to be systematically skewed toward government narratives.

Political ownership prohibitions apply only to audiovisual broadcasting. Print and online media face no legal restrictions on political ownership. The database reveals numerous politically owned newspapers and news websites operating without legal prohibition. Political actors excluded from broadcasting ownership can establish news websites or newspapers entirely within legal bounds. This sectoral gap enables political ownership to migrate to unregulated sectors, undermining the intent of ownership restrictions.

Beyond ownership and infrastructure, state advertising flows to outlets without transparent allocation criteria, monitoring, or oversight. The legal assessment confirms: "The concept of state advertisement is not addressed in the audiovisual media legislation. It provides no definition and no monitoring mechanism of advertising allocation." Undisclosed state advertising allocation creates financial incentives for outlets to align coverage with political interests and creates leverage for political pressure on editorial independence.

These five mechanisms interact to create systemic political control. Majority-owned political outlets are constrained by politically controlled infrastructure. This system is dominated by a public broadcaster with documented ruling party bias, while political outlets flourish in unregulated print and online sectors—where a politician excluded from owning a television station can freely establish a news website. Throughout, a favorable relationship with the government can provide privileged access to state advertising allocation. Political control operates through multiple simultaneous mechanisms, not through isolated intervention. The result is a media landscape that appears pluralist—multiple outlets, diverse voices—but functions as a politicised ecosystem where media outlets themselves are the competition venues through which different political forces advance their interests.

Political control over media is assessed as high risk across all three indicators:

D.8 – Political Control Over Media Outlets – Risk is assessed as high because the database reflects political connections in the majority of studied media outlets, and legal gaps enable political ownership to migrate to unregulated media sectors.

D.9 – Political Control Over Infrastructure – Risk is assessed as high because infrastructure is concentrated among actors with political connections, enabling political leverage over media access and distribution.

D.10 – State Control Over Media Resources – Risk is assessed as high because public broadcaster political appointments are combined with documented editorial bias, and state advertising allocation mechanisms are opaque and unmonitored.

• To neutralize these risks, the following measures are necessary:
• Extend political ownership restrictions to all media sectors.
• Make infrastructure access transparent and establish monitoring mechanisms.
• Ensure public broadcaster governance independence from political appointments.
• Create transparent mechanisms for state advertising allocation.